



**EXTERNAL EVALUATION OF THE DEC-FUNDED
PHILIPPINE RED CROSS AND BRITISH RED CROSS
LIVELIHOODS AND SHELTER RECOVERY
PROGRAMME
ILOILO PROVINCE, PHILIPPINES**

DEC evaluation, Haiyan recovery programme

Management response, April 2016

The evaluation methodology comprised the collection of community level data with conclusions supported by key informant interviews, M&E data along with a validation workshop. This response focuses on section 2.1 of the evaluation report: 'Brief Answers to Main Evaluation Questions'. This response does not seek to challenge the findings, which management finds reasonable and reflective of the actual situation. It does, however, seek to add some additional commentary to help put the findings into context.

1. Effectiveness

We agree that Livelihoods support does not necessarily lead to reduced debt and a more stable income as many other factors come into play. We also agree that community based groups such as savings and loans may lead to increased resilience over an extended period of time.

We also agree that Livelihoods and Shelter were known priorities for the affected communities and that the two (along with all other facets of family and community life) are complimentary.

We agree that the idea of supporting those who are not supported by others is not necessarily as effective as complimentary programming between different agencies (although it is one way of ensuring that more people receive at least some help).

We agree that programming the community-focused work ahead of the high-value work would have led to improved trust and knowledge building; this is a significant area of learning for BRC/PRC.

2. Efficiency

We agree that PRC systems have been severely stretched by the Haiyan operation. Whilst it would have been difficult and unwise to partake in systems change in the midst of such a large operation PRC are committed to reviewing their support systems and disaster preparedness. BRC along with 12 other Red Cross partners are committed to an 18-month capacity enhancement programme due to begin implementation in mid-2016.

We agree that cash has been an important component of the PRC support package and that this is similar to other agency's programming. In other sectors not covered by this report PRC have also been engaged in community and beneficiary-managed implementation, which has proven to be effective.

3. Impact

We agree that the core shelter has had a significant impact on people's lives and that the SRA programming has also had a positive impact although with less impact on safer building techniques. BRC have recently carried out a follow up programme to the SRA to reinforce the build back safer message but we accept that SRA programming will not be able to provide the same level of safety as core housing; it can, however, be implemented swiftly.

Whilst we agree with the Livelihood findings regarding reduced financial stress and the positive impact of community groups should they prove to be sustainable; we would add the programme design of partnership with Government Agencies as being a supporting factor in longer-term sustainability.

4. Relevance

We agree that Livelihoods and Shelter interventions in Iloilo was an entirely appropriate response.

As noted above we think it is an important area of learning for BRC that good technical data will not necessarily lead to a focus on the most vulnerable and that strong community-based processes are required. This along with improved accountability to beneficiaries would lead to an increase in trust and less controversy over selection processes.

We accept that although all of our beneficiaries suffered damage to their shelter, not all of them could be considered as vulnerable. We also accept that leading with the beneficiary focussed activities (Livelihoods and Shelter) and not the community-based work (DRR, Health, WASH) made it difficult to implement a fully integrated programme with a focus on broader needs.

5. Standards

We welcome the evaluator's conclusion that the programme was designed and delivered in alignment with internationally recognised standards.

6. Accountability

We agree that there is a trade-off between coherent programming and being responsive to locally identified need; this trade off also affects the programme's ability to respond quickly. The centralised "one size fits all" approach is mostly evident in the core shelter programme where the beneficiary input is limited to location selection and their ability to add to the core shelter according to their needs and resources. The SRA and Livelihoods programmes have increased localised flexibility due to the use of cash programming and tailored training.

7. Learning

We agree that the scale of the recovery operation means that many of the PRC employees and volunteers will not have a long-term employment with PRC and that the PRC Technical Working Groups have been the focus for past learning and will continue to be the focus for future learning. The Technical Working Groups were able to draw on the lessons of around 17 RC partner organisations (7 of whom were typically active members).

8. Coherence

We agree that the leadership of the PRC and the work of the Technical Working Groups has been a major factor in achieving a coherent programme across the work of 17 supporting partners. A major learning for PRC has been a need to look again at their administrative systems that struggled to keep pace with the required speed of implementation.

We also agree that cooperation with local government was limited to the Livelihood activities although in other parts of the programme there is close cooperation in disaster risk reduction and health. Linkages with non-governmental actors have been limited both by PRC capacity and the limited number of other actors in the project area.

9. Sustainability


Whilst it is the aim PRC to have 143 volunteers in every Barangay in the country this is a very long term goal. For now we accept that the capacity of the Iloilo chapter to support activities such as livelihood groups beyond the September 2016 recovery programme end date is limited. The cooperation and links with Local Government developed by the livelihood programming is the main strategy for longer-term sustainability although we are also investigating possibilities of cooperation with some NGOs where available and appropriate.

BRC are supporting a capacity enhancement programme with the Iloilo chapter mainly focussed on staff and volunteer training and equipment in disaster preparedness and response. Given their limited resources it is unlikely that local chapter's will seek to have the capacity for major recovery programming and will continue to rely on leadership from the centre.

External Evaluation of DEC-funded Livelihoods and Shelter Recovery Program in Iloilo Province

April 21, 2016

John Levers



Declaration and thanks: This evaluation is a collaborative effort of a large evaluation team, led by John Levers a consultant. Emily Rogers and Luke Tredget, from British Red Cross in London, contributed significantly to the design of the methodology, especially in promoting participatory learning. Luke also contributed to the initial training workshop and access to information. Sultan Ahmed, British Red Cross MEAL delegate based in Manila, continued support to the evaluation and validation workshop.

The evaluation team from Iloilo was admirably led by Shiela R Castillo Tiangco with significant support from Angel Grace Bandianon and Jhoann Canionio, in many aspects. The team of Philippine Red Cross staff and volunteers, whose effort and knowledge directly contributed to this evaluation, are listed here in alphabetical order: Alexis Baldia, Bevelyn Basultin, Carmelli Grace Dilag, Dannen May Soriano, Eden Grace Casabuena, Ian Val Maderazo, Ilyne Rose Magno, Jenelyn Magno, Jinel Jardinico, Josie Bornaes, Kyle Fanega, and Lorna Batislaon.

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1 Introduction

Typhoon Haiyan (local name Yolanda) struck the Philippines in November 2013, as the strongest recorded storm ever to make landfall. Haiyan killed over 6,300 people, damaged or destroyed 4.1 million homes and affected an estimated 14 million people. Haiyan was one of 25 typhoons or storms which entered the Philippines area of responsibility in 2013). Climate change threatens the Philippines with more frequent and intense typhoons. Haiyan established a *new benchmark* in the possible intensity of typhoons.

Haiyan received significant media coverage, and the United Nation's declared their "highest level 3 emergency" and different parts of the Red Cross Movement launched emergency appeals. The total Red Cross Haiyan income was £250 million/CHF 345.6 million. In the UK, the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) appeal raised over £95 million, and allocated approximately £6.4 million to the British Red Cross. Of this, the British Red Cross spent £1.8 million in Phase 1 during the initial 6 months, and the remaining £4.6 million during Phase 2, which is the focus of this evaluation.


1. 1 The Programme

Haiyan was a large disaster causing the UN to activate its highest level 3 response mechanism. Similarly, the Red Cross expanded to meet the challenge. The Philippine Red Cross robustly coordinated and managed the response and recovery operation within a Red Cross Movement-wide operational framework.

Following the initial disaster response phase, the British Red Cross worked with Philippines Red Cross, IFRC and Movement partners to develop a country-wide plan for recovery. This resulted in British Red Cross and Philippine Red Cross working in partnership in Iloilo province, an area that was affected by the typhoon but remained underserved by the humanitarian sector. British Red Cross and Philippine Red Cross initiated a £10 million recovery program in two municipalities of Iloilo, including investments in shelter, livelihoods, health, DRR and WASH. In April 2014, British Red Cross submitted a plan to Disasters Emergency Committee to use £4.6 million Phase 2 funds to pay for approximately 42% of the program, namely shelter and livelihoods interventions. The below graph shows approximate spend per sector for DEC funds excluding overhead costs.

DEC funded almost all of the program's livelihoods actions, 84% of its shelter repair assistance (SRA) and about 40% of its core shelter. A table, in annex 5, provides an overview of planned and achieved targets as well as planned and actual timelines.

The program worked in 57 Barangays (villages) in 2 municipalities. Barangays included island barangays, peri-urban communities, coastal (mostly fisher folk) and inland (rice farming) barangays. Most barangays have mixed sources of income, predominantly farming, fishing and vending/commerce. The total number of Red Cross packages (shelter and livelihoods) per households in each Barangay varied significantly from 27% to 141%. On average, 63% of households in each community received a benefit package (either livelihoods or Shelter). See annex 4 for number of packages per household in each barangay.



2 Executive Summary

2.1 Brief Answers to Main Evaluation Questions

Effectiveness: Did the project have a strong theory of change/logic with clearly articulated outcomes? To what extent has the project met its proposed outcomes and objectives?

The overall programme plan was largely focussed on output-level indicators, however the DEC proposal did include some outcome-level aspirations, namely to *meet the short and medium-term income needs of people, and to increase the structural resilience of dwellings so they could withstand 310kph winds*. These objectives were consistent most Red Cross and non-Red Cross assessments, which clearly identified shelter and livelihoods as the two priority sectors.

The shelter programme targeted 4,578 households, significantly less than the initial proposal of 8,500, due to a reduction in the level of Shelter Repair Assistance (SRA) packages. However, the number of higher-value core shelters delivered more than doubled (from 500 to 1004), and the evaluation found that these shelters had a significant impact on family life, allowing independence, privacy, comfort and a firmer, weather-proof space. The core shelter also provided an improved level of structural resilience; although not to the ambitious and unrealistic initial target (houses could withstand approx. 200kph winds, rather than 310kph). The SRA package also did contribute – along with people’s own efforts and support from other organisations – to get a roof over people’s heads and improve the waterproofing of their homes, but did not succeed in achieving safer building techniques.

The livelihoods programme surpassed its original target of reaching 3000 people, and ultimately provided short and (to some extent) medium-term support to 5,180 farmers, fisherfolk and small business (microenterprise) owners. The assistance helped farmers recover one harvest, but it has been more challenging to achieve medium-term change through measures such as crop insurance or a saving and loan scheme; this lack is more pronounced given the current El Nino conditions affecting farmers this year. Microenterprise groups made strong progress with regards recovering business and planning diversification and/or expansion, and this was closely linked to the programme’s support in forming savings and loans groups, and improving access to markets, capital, and skills training.

Whilst a theory of change was not explicitly articulated within the programme planning documents, the evaluator concluded that one was implicit within the centrally-established guidelines (which stated the expected benefits of each intervention), namely that **the planned livelihoods and shelter activities would lead to a stable, more resilient future**. This implicit theory of change was based on the following assumptions, which this evaluation challenged or validated as follows:

- **Livelihoods support leads to reduced debt and increases stable income:** the evaluation challenges this assumption, in that it was found that households rely on multiple sources of income (and expenditure), which are more dependent on weather patterns, markets, environmental damage and other complex factors, as opposed to simple lack of capital to re-establish business. In addition, the assumption is further challenged by the finding that a household’s priority might not be reducing debt, but in paying other essential items (e.g. school expenses or medicine). However, it was found that savings and loan groups (and, if properly utilised, crop insurance) could build resilience in the medium term by providing networks of mutual support and self-managed capital.

- **Supporting people's livelihoods is connected to improving their shelter needs, and vice versa.** The evaluation validated this assumption, as people in each sector-specific focus group discussion highlighted the importance of changes in other sectors, and ranked these as among the most important. People highlighted the interconnectedness of decisions relating to shelter and livelihoods, and how they might have to choose between business investments and undertaking shelter repairs. In addition, people highlighted that receiving a core shelter has reduced their household expenditure, in that they no longer have to spend money on maintaining poorly-built makeshift shelters (this benefit should last up to five years).
- **PRC/BRC should support people who do not receive other external support from the government or NGOs.** In the evaluator's view this was an invalid assumption. Group interviews showed the importance of other actors in complementing or leading shelter and livelihoods, for example some SRA beneficiaries also received tools from IoM that helped rebuild shelters. The Red Cross should work in line with other organisations that add value to programme outputs.
- **The PRC/BRC programme selected the most vulnerable and most in need.** The programme focussed primarily on farmers and fisher folk and, whilst these were valid target groups, they are often not the most vulnerable members of the community. In addition, the groups were hard to clearly identify as most households have multiple sources of income. Selecting houses based on the level of damage did allow the programme to target those with poor housing and was a valid proxy for vulnerability, but more careful consideration is needed to improve capacity for effective recovery (see recommendation on re-sequencing community process to allow assistance to get to those most in need/most vulnerable).
- **Barangay Recovery Committees will select those most in need.** By starting the programme with interventions of high value, PRC/BRC created competition for selection within communities. It would have been more appropriate to re-sequence the intervention with VCA or other community-focused work, in order to establish trust and knowledge-building between the PRC/BRC and the community.

> **Efficiency: To what extent have resources been used effectively and efficiently?**

All of the support processes of the programme – HR, finance, logistics and administration – were provided by PRC, and these were designed for smaller, longer-term operations. This evaluation (and almost all key informant interviews) showed that limitations in these support systems caused significant delays and complications, frustrating staff, beneficiaries and partners alike. *Reforming support systems would be the greatest improvement PRC could make, allowing them to be a more effective and efficient leader in major Red Cross responses in the Philippines.* PRC commissioned a study, not available to this evaluation, into restructuring its support systems.

The value to households of PRC/BRC benefit packages is similar to that offered by other government and non-government organisations. Cash proved to be an efficient response modality, and gave people choices over the use of support packages.

> **Impact. Are there any measurable HH level impacts to date?**

As stated above, the provision of core shelter (valued at approx. £1440) contributed significantly to people's lives, increasing their privacy, independence and allowing some families that had been separated since Haiyan to reunite. The SRA package (valued at approx. £215) was one of a number of factors that helped people achieve a stronger and more waterproof dwelling, although the SRA did not achieve a significant uptake in safer building techniques.

With regards livelihoods, the cash disbursement (approx. £143) reduced the financial stress on micro-enterprise beneficiaries, allowed rice farmers to purchase inputs for one cropping cycle, and allowed members of both groups increased access to other essential items such as food and medicine. The savings and loan groups have allowed microenterprise beneficiaries to recover livelihoods and have given them a buffer against future emergencies, although improved markets and increased demand were the main drivers of business growth. However, the programme's promotion of crop insurance – the main medium-term intervention for rice farmers – only achieved a small uptake in coverage, and the system remains poorly understood.

> *Relevance: To what extent did the project activities support those most in need? Was the scale and nature of the project appropriate and proportional to the Philippine Red Cross / British Red Cross capacity, experience and mandate?*

Most post-Haiyan assessments cited shelter and livelihoods as the priority needs, and as such the focus of the programme was well-founded. The decision to work in Iloilo was also justified, even though this area was not the worst-affected by Haiyan. The broader Red Cross Haiyan operation covered all affected regions, and the allocation of areas to different Red Cross partner societies (British Red Cross, German Red Cross, American Red Cross, etc) took into account factors such as the size, capacity and long-term presence in the country.

The Barangay Recovery Committee system was designed to help facilitate the programme and identify vulnerable people in each community, but this failed. Most interview groups clearly expressed that assistance did not go to the most vulnerable or the most in need. In addition, the programme was integrated to a very limited extent, with sectors managing their interventions mostly in parallel. This limited PRC/BRC's ability to address issues such as land rights and to better allocate resources to the most vulnerable individuals.

> *Standards: Have the Red Cross values and principles been respected, as well as the Code of Conduct and Sphere standards?*

The PRC technical working groups in shelter and livelihoods set common, one-size-fits-all guidelines for the programme, which matched or surpassed Sphere standards, local directives, and other international guides.

> *Accountability: To what extent have beneficiaries been involved in programme design and delivery?*

The shelter and livelihoods programmes did not significantly involve beneficiaries in designing programme strategies or selecting target groups. However, PRC/BRC involved people in programme delivery, especially the microenterprise beneficiaries, who self-selected and formed their own saving and loan groups. Also, the use of cash as a modality allowed beneficiaries significant flexibility in spending. With regards shelter, anecdotal stories highlighted adaptations in core shelter orientation, design and materials, either on an individual basis or through structured feedback, such as mid- or post-distribution monitoring. The PRC technical working groups have incorporated many of these adaptations into updated Guidance notes.

> Learning: Have past lessons and Disasters Emergency Committee or member RTE recommendations been considered?

Three quarters of key informants stated that the PRC/BRC programme used the technical guidance notes as a means of identifying relevant lessons from previous operations, and as a means of capturing lessons throughout the operation. Half the informants highlighted that the majority of staff in the Haiyan operation will not be employed by PRC in the long-term, and therefore the technical working groups and guidance notes are a key means of capturing learning for future operations.

In March 2015, a Mid-Term Review was conducted that provided the programme with several useful recommendations, and it should also be noted that the PRC/BRC PMER team in Iloilo was seen as a benchmark for future MEAL structures within the PRC.

> Coherence: How effective was the coordination with other Red Cross Movement and non-Movement actors? How does the programme fit with other programmes implemented in by the HNS?

The Philippines Red Cross national headquarters played a significant role in decision-making and coordination, succeeding in enforcing a one programme, one movement approach - a major challenge given the 15-25 in-country Partner National Societies. Almost all key informants recognised the benefits of successfully enforcing a one-movement approach, but emphasised that the centralised systems and decision-making caused delays and led to staff morale issues.

Almost all key informants recognised the positive and significant role of the technical working groups in aligning standards and allowing partner national societies to contribute to the overall operation. However, PRC managed the Haiyan response and recovery programme largely in parallel to the pre-Haiyan chapters system. More recently the programme and chapters are attempting to align using a community-led volunteer system.

Most coordination efforts were directed within the Red Cross movement, however locally the programme team coordinated with the LGU and a few NGO actors in the local area. This coordination impacted positively on the programme, creating collaborations with LGUs, Department of Agriculture, TESDA (government training agency) and an insurance company.

> Sustainability: How does the programme fit with other (current and future) initiatives in the target communities, undertaken/supported by other actors? What is the extent to which the programme outcomes can be sustained in communities without British Red Cross support?

Shelter beneficiaries understand the transitional nature of the assistance and its limited longevity. They feel responsible for and have plans to reinforce, extend and maintain their shelters after the PRC/BRC programme ends. SRA beneficiaries plan to finish or reinforce structural elements of their shelters. Similarly, those benefiting from core shelter recognise limitations to longevity of the coco-lumber and plan to replace or repair walls, columns and other elements when they have the money. Both SRA and core shelter beneficiaries plan to maintain shelters using paint and protection for coco-lumber. Additionally, people either plan or have already extended their core shelters by investing in kitchens and porches.

Farmers plan to continue farming with only a few considering forming associations and/or continuing with crop insurance. However, many microenterprise groups plan expansion, diversification and continuance using saving groups, which are just now starting to pay financial dividends. Microenterprise savings groups need additional support and the PRC/BRC livelihood team is considering options. PRC/BRC collaborated well with Department of Education, and is partnering with PCIC, an insurance provider. In addition, PRC/BRC collaborated with initiatives from Local Government Units in access to markets and future skills training. However, as is planned and recommended by the PRC/BRC liveli-

hood team, further support is needed to microenterprise groups and saving schemes to improve continuance of interventions.

The limited links to PRC chapters throughout the programme cycle reduces options for sustaining community links, staff skills and benefits of the programme. However, investments are planned in capacity-building for the chapter as well as a focus on the RC143 volunteer initiative, which is outside the scope of this evaluation.

2.2 Summary of Recommendations

Recommendations – SRA and Core Shelter

Current program, transition or immediate study

- The current program should invest in a follow-up initiative to allow accessibility to shelters & latrines for persons with disabilities (up to 9% of total), perhaps using an additional 2016 distribution package for additional strengthening of earlier shelter repair packages. It should be noted that in 2015, the shelter technical working group approved adapted core shelter designs including ramps for wheelchair access as well as adapted designs improving access to latrines for the disabled.
- Depending on the PRC Iloilo chapter's evolving capacity and the success of the RC143 volunteer system, PRC should further invest in training community builders in PASSA/build back safer and pre-positioning emergency shelter kits for future emergencies. This could link with the IFRC "IFRC Shelter Kit Training", which may be used by Philippines Red Cross in 2016¹. After the disaster, these resilience building trainings should be done at the earliest possible opportunity, especially for those involved in reconstruction. These trainings and the PASSA process is important for communities to increase resilience not just using Red Cross assistance but also rebuilding from individual and community resources.
- The shelter technical working group should commission a study to understand if shelters built using Red Cross shelter repair assistance (SRA) outside Iloilo had similar issues with safety and poor quality repair. This study should be similar to the report on Post Distribution Monitoring on Building Quality carried out in September 2015 by the PRC/BRC Iloilo team that focused on the SRA. The study could use the Iloilo program as a possible counterfactual to the efficacy of PASSA/Build Back Safer training and IEC materials.

Preparing for future emergencies

- In future disasters, PASSA training should be done at the earliest possible opportunity to contribute to all reconstruction, not just Red Cross initiatives. This is a very low cost action.
- The core shelter guidance note should be updated to allow for ease of replacement of different structural elements (especially roofing) to ensure that elements are waterproof and include a locally derived maintenance kit based on local construction techniques and materials.
- The shelter program should - preferably before or immediately after a large disaster - maintain contracts with preferred suppliers to provide seasoned/dried lumber or timber. The type of timber to be used should be decided by the technical working groups considering large scale availability, cost, longevity, environmental impact and local techniques and preferences.

¹ Detailed knowledge this was outside the scope of the evaluation

- For future emergencies, the core shelter technical working group should in their guidelines include a process to identify and respond to the needs of persons with disabilities and the elderly, such as ramps, hand-rails or easier access to latrines². It is noted that in 2015, the shelter technical working group approved a new ramp design.

Recommendations – Livelihoods

- The livelihoods technical working group should initiate a specialist study on the dynamics of income and debt for farmers, fisher folk and other targeted groups to inform outcome-level indicators for future recoveries. This needs to be based on a multi-year seasonal calendar. It should start with a desk review of government reports on household income and expenditure reports as well as existing studies on income and debt for small scale farmers and fisher folk. The study should be carried out by a sector specialist. The aim of the study is to understand the best forms of recovery interventions, their timing and tools for resilience building (e.g. within micro-finance) available to Philippine Red Cross.
- Philippine Red Cross Iloilo chapter should ensure that microenterprise savings groups receive additional organisational support from a microenterprise financial institution or rural bank. PRC/BRC livelihood team is currently looking at suitable institutions. It is important to note that the driver is market and demand for produce or diversification rather than increase in savings, thus retaining links with local government is important.
- Crop insurance is highly relevant but confusing and bureaucratic in its current format. The Philippine Red Cross should seek, through BRC or a long-term PNS, to establish links with micro-finance institutions for insurance with farmers, learning from experience outside Philippines to see if paramedic insurance or other innovation in farming associations can be incorporated into future recovery. Insurance is a long term but critical resilience building tool.

Recommendations – Defining Decisions and Processes

- The planned PRC meta-evaluation should focus on changes to the PRC guidance notes, recognising that most Haiyan staff are contractual and thus only some will be available for future emergencies.
- In all sectors, PRC guidance notes should have a range of benefits which can be adapted to each context using pre-defined adaption criteria.
- National sector technical working groups should be maintained as an owner of knowledge but also include a group focused on strategies and outcome-level resilience building indicators and sequencing of actions.
- For future emergencies, management and support systems should be re-organised to function as close as possible to where the impact of that decision would be felt or gained. This would improve transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. There are multiple tried and tested models designed for organisations with both development and humanitarian operations that are also accepted by a range of donors. It is understood PRC commissioned a study to this issue.

² See <http://www.didrrn.net/home/> for further contacts in the region

Recommendations – Community Processes

- (Note - this was developed during the validation workshop) BRC (or a well-placed long-term PNS) should support the technical working groups, in a process to develop a guideline for PRC/BRC volunteer management and building skills in community facilitation and communication. These investments will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of programs, community engagement, and reduce conflict and miscommunication.
- For future emergencies, The BRC (or a well-placed long-term PNS) should support the PRC to develop a structure for formal *walk-in consultations* to Red Cross office as a complement to the hotline or a regular *open desk* in communities. However, the need for this should reduce with improved communications through assemblies and volunteer communication training.

3 Methodology

The evaluation primarily focuses on the DEC funded elements of the program, including shelter and physical latrine assistance as well as livelihood interventions including skills trainings, household cash grants, crop-insurance, and savings groups for micro-enterprise. Additionally, the program includes 18 community cash-for-work projects.

The evaluation was conducted at the end of the BRC's DEC-funded program from December 2015 to February 2016. BRC will complete most of its Haiyan program by June 2016.

The evaluation consultant, with advice and support from BRC, adapted a mixed-methods approach, to collect both qualitative and quantitative information from community groups, key informants and internal and external documents. **A community participatory group interview** methodology was adapted from the Feinstein International Centre's design guide to participatory impact assessment³ which was shared by the BRC P&A Advisor based in London, Emily Rogers. In addition, the team leader conducted key informant semi-structured interviews (**see annex 3 for guidance notes created by the evaluation**). Throughout the evaluation team leader collated and quantified varied information collected into an evaluation matrix (see inception report) to *follow the evidence*. This provided a triangulated evidence base from which to inform and explore answers to the evaluation questions, as well as further in-depth use of existing data to enrich findings.

Desk review and key informant interviews

In December 2015, the team leader, a consultant, completed an initial desk review and inception report. The team leader then conducted **24 Key informal semi-structured interviews** including with 7 key British Red Cross staff in London via Skype, 8 Red Cross staff based in or previously based in Manila (face-to-face and by phone) as well as 10 Red Cross staff based in Iloilo and Ajuy (face-to-face). Additionally, the team leader interviewed the regional manager of an insurance company who collaborated with the Red Cross.

Community-level data collection



The evaluation team also included a core of 11 Philippine staff and volunteers, mostly from the PRC/BRC MEAL team based in Ajuy, speaking the local language, with 4 additional PRC/BRC technical program assistants participating in the training and facilitating some group interviews. The evalu-

³ For further information see <http://fic.tufts.edu/publication-item/participatory-impact-assessment-a-design-guide/>

ation team, with the support of Luke Tredget from the British Red Cross, developed detailed guidance and methodologies for participatory group interviews during a 4-day workshop/training event including a 1-day pilot with communities.

In communities, the evaluation team facilitated groups of 5 to 15 people. The **team held 64 participatory group interviews with 729 people of which 68% were women, visiting 23% of all communities involved in the program (13).**

The team developed two main types of interviews. Firstly, exploring communication, participation and selection issues with groups of beneficiaries (64%) and non-beneficiaries (36%) separated by sex. Secondly, exploring by sectoral intervention significant changes to people’s lives as well as factors that contributed to those changes as well as future plans and perceived risks to continue the benefits of PRC/BRC program. These sector groups followed the program’s interventions - Core Shelter, SRA, Farmers, Fisher folk, micro-enterprise as well as community Cash or Work projects.



The group interviews sought evidence relating to integration in two ways. Firstly, in investigating how the PRC/BRC and communities communicated, participated and selected people to benefit or design different aspects of the program, thus informing the level of potential integration from program processes. Secondly, in comparing changes to people’s lives outside sectoral interventions and their contributing factors, thus informing community perspectives of how different sectors integrate within peo-

ple's lives. However, the evaluation followed what the program actually did, and thus evaluated primarily by sector intervention.

Analysis of community-level data collection

During participatory group interviews, participants and facilitators collated responses for each session. Participants agreed and then ranked these responses. During the analysis, the evaluator calculated and presented frequency of responses. Additionally, groups also ranked in order of importance the changes to their lives. The evaluator assigned a value to this rank, with the first rank change scoring 10 points, second rank 9, third rank 8 and so on. For *changes to people's lives session* the evaluator then added all these scores per response area. It was decided during the inception workshop not to use a more complex scoring system.

Results showed convergence and consistency in some answers (such as selection) after 6 visits, but not in all (such as the important changes to peoples' lives). Convergence and consistency for group interviews focused on sectoral changes, appeared after about 10 communities. It is the evaluator's opinion that the number of interviews and time in communities was correct, given the time invested in training staff, the importance of building PRC's capacity for participatory evaluation, and the importance of achieving a clear convergence in responses. It is worth noting that by the end of the evaluation all volunteers had facilitated a group interview to a satisfactory quality.

The participatory group interviews also included both an actual and ideal timeline. The primary purpose of the actual timeline was to frame the discussion and warm-up the participants starting with an active hands-on session, before discussing in depth changes to their lives. The evaluation designed the ideal timeline to allow the groups to suggest changes to the process. This session did not produce much useful information, as it included too many layers of evidence, causing confusion amongst facilitators, and was too sector focused. The evaluation emphasized more recommendations and conclusions relating to the sequencing and changes to timeline of interventions from key informant interviews and the professional experience of a working group in the validation workshop (and the evaluator). In the validation workshop, a specific working group with very experienced British and Philippines Red Cross managers built a recommendation relating to overall process, built on the findings of the evaluation.

M&E data

In addition, the evaluation benefited from large amounts of quantitative and qualitative reporting generated from the program and its MEAL team. This included base and end line assessments, mid and post-distribution monitoring reports, a mid-term review and sector-specific reviews and assessments exploring critical issues for action. The evaluation included aspects of this monitoring and evaluation information, when this information was relevant to the evaluation questions and/or used by the PRC/BRC program, or where it was supported or conflicted with findings. The team leader further investigated evidence which provided conflicting information, most notably income and debt changes for micro-enterprise and farmers groups. This conflict informed additional recommendations.

Validation workshop

In Ajuy, the team facilitated a validation workshop attended by 41 people including community members, Barangay officials, and representatives from Red Cross Iloilo chapter, Red Cross technical working groups from Manila, and the PRC/BRC team. This workshop concluded with a learning session focusing on the ideal sequencing for program integration; underlying barriers for program communication and participation; as well as learning for communication and complaints mechanisms.

3.1 Declarations and limitations

PRC/BRC staff and volunteers facilitated community groups

PRC/BRC staff and volunteers, many from the local area, facilitated community groups in the local language. Community members and authorities knew many of the team. The team leader designed the methodology to consider this. Each section of findings involved community written validation with community members agreeing and ranking all findings. In addition, on sensitive areas, such as selection of beneficiaries, communities validated their perspective after exploring their knowledge of selec-

tion criteria and names of key committees such as the PRC/BRC-established Barangay Recovery Committee. The team did not wear Red Cross shirts or identification, but openly introduced themselves and highlighted the purpose of the evaluation for openness and learning for future emergencies. The results on sensitive issues such as selection indicate that this limitation was overcome.

Some men and women's groups were facilitated by teams comprising of both men and women.

The team was mostly women, reflecting the gender make-up of volunteers and the MEAL department. There were not enough men to ensure that facilitation, co-facilitation and reporting of men's groups was done by men. The evaluation did not include highly gender-sensitive questions. However, to mitigate this where possible both facilitation and co-facilitation was done by the same gender.

Sector specific groups were facilitated by staff and volunteers from different sectors

The team largely comprised of MEAL staff and volunteers. However, PRC/BRC technical program advisors contributed to the detailed design of the community participatory methodology and conducted a small number of Participatory group interviews. This added knowledge and insight into evaluation. In the community, sector staff facilitated groups of other sectors, thus acting as peer reviewers rather than direct implementers.

The design of the methodology followed the logic of the program and considered known findings for which action is planned or ongoing.

The evaluation questions were broad, allowing the evaluation team leader flexibility to explore some aspects more than others. The evaluation team leader focused on following the actual process of the program as well as focusing more on unknowns and providing practical recommendations. Additional evidence was collected to validate or re-assess explored issues with planned actions, such as the functionality of the selection process, resilience building through the shelter repair assistance as well as the bureaucratic limitations of the Philippine Red Cross. However, the recommendations considered ongoing actions of these key known issues.

4 Findings, conclusions and recommendations

Findings are presented in three main sections.

1. **Changes** to people's lives and the program's **contribution to and** plans for **continuance** of the benefits of the program.
2. **Defining decisions and processes** following the evolution of the program.
3. **Communication, participation and selection** expressed largely from the community perspective.

This section evaluates shelter and livelihood interventions. It looks separately at shelter repair assistance, core shelter construction (including latrines), support to micro-enterprise and rice farmers as well as the small cash for work community projects. The evaluation draws findings from participatory group interviews, key informant interviews as well as PRC/BRC baseline- endline- and distribution-monitoring reports and focus group discussion, budgeting, sector and donor reports, initial plans, and log frames. The section explores what was done, its cost, changes which affected people from beneficiary perspectives as well as looking at factors which contributed to those changes. The section also evaluates community and beneficiary plans for sustaining actions as PRC/BRC prepares to leave as well as evaluating longevity and systems to support actions.

4.1 Findings for Shelter

The Philippine Red Cross shelter and settlement guidelines detail the following options and priorities. The program provided both Core Shelter and Shelter Repair Assistance.

Graph 4 – PRC defined shelter response options from guidelines		
	TARGET GROUP	MODALITY
Full shelter assistance (Core Shelter)	1st priority group: Totally destroyed houses. Families living in tents/makeshift shelter, worst condition and have no capacity to rebuild.	Awareness raising + materials + construction
Shelter repair assistance	2nd priority group: Partially Damaged houses (roofing, walls). Families living in their damaged house and with assistance can repair their house.	Awareness raising + materials + cash
Permanent housing project – relocations	3rd priority group: Requirement for families to be relocated from no build zone.	Contractor or owner driven/community driven
Shelter retrofitting assistance	4th priority group: Families living in repaired houses but they do not include DRR technics and are still vulnerable.	Awareness raising + cash + technical support

4.1.1 Shelter Repair Assistance

The shelter repair assistance package initially proposed to Disasters Emergency Committee aimed for *8,000 dwellings to be built back better through repair and retrofitting and that houses are repaired to recommended humanitarian specifications (appropriate to context) able to withstand 310 km wind speed and 7.2 Earthquake magnitude.* By late 2014, the PRC/BRC program in Iloilo distributed 3,515 shelter repair packages. Few packages were distributed with IEC materials for Building Back Safer. Thus, it is unsurprising that PRC/BRC team in Ajuy evaluated that 94% of houses have weak or unsafe elements. Importantly, leading the way for other RC and non-red cross shelter programs, the PRC/BRC shelter team in Ajuy took the initiative to question the result of their shelter repair assistance program and take remedial actions. The evaluation did not see any documentation of this same initiative elsewhere in the Red Cross Haiyan recovery program.



**Shelter repair assistance
distribution of CGI roofing sheets**

The shelter repair assistance package is a standardized package including 10 roofing sheets (CGI) and PHP 10,000 /£143 in cash with a total value of about Php15,000/£215. PRC/BRC selected people for shelter repair assistance based on who were deemed to have the capacity to recover. The Philippine Red Cross Recovery Shelter Guidelines note that selection should be through the Barangay recovery committees based on damage as well as vulnerability criteria and some exclusion criteria. The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) also provided emergency shelter assistance to families whose houses were damaged, in the form of cash assistance worth Php30,000/£430. DSWD also worked in Red Cross areas and was intended for families who have not received any shelter assistance from the government or private sector⁴. A number of beneficiaries reportedly returned Red Cross beneficiary cards to receive the higher DSWD benefit.


The mid-term review expressed concerns relating to “build back safer” in the shelter repair assistance. The Ajuy office, led other RC programming in questioning the level of building back safer achieved with the shelter repair assistance package. The report noted that after logistic delays materials were distributed without IEC materials or full training of builders in build back safer technology. In February 2015, PRC/BRC reported that only 92 or 2.6% of a targeted 3,516 community champions in PASSA were in place. A September 2015, shelter repair assistance report on Post Distribution Monitoring on Building Quality highlighted serious shortcoming in improving resilience of shelters with 94% of roofs assessed as weak or very weak due to the lack of knowledge in build back safer by carpenters. In addition, 80% of walls still needed bracing and 80% of columns required treatment. Similar problems existed in other structural components. The shelter team is proactively planning additional support, with an additional small cash grant to be given to Shelter Repair Assistant beneficiaries to enable them to buy additional fixtures and fittings, accompanied by a trade fair with miniature houses to demonstrate safer practices and traders promoting the most useful materials for making shelter safer.

Participatory group interviews - changes from shelter repair assistance

The evaluation team facilitated 9 participatory group interviews with 93 recipients of the shelter repair assistance package, also known as “CGI” in communities. 78% of those who participated in groups were women. The groups discussed and ranked the main changes to their lives since Haiyan, the factors which contributed to those changes and future plans relating to their shelter.

⁴ <http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/dswd-releases-more-shelter-aid-yolanda-survivors-w-visayas>

Graph 5 - Significant changes reported by 9 Shelter Repair Assistance beneficiaries groups




Participants in the shelter repair groups reported a significant number of changes to their lives, relating to shelter, the most significant are

- Feeling safer and more comfortable especially against harsh weather as their house is now firm and re-built.** During the group discussions this feeling related to waterproofing of the shelters as well as having firmer and more complete houses compared to shanty or temporary houses within which people lived before and after Haiyan. The high quality of the roof was frequently noted. People reported that a number of factors contributed to this change including people's own efforts in rebuilding their houses with support from PRC/BRC as well as in some areas contributions from DSWD, IoM (tent and tools), the church and other NGOs. In June 2015 focus group discussions held as part of the post-distribution monitoring note that some people felt safer because they moved the house to a safer, nearby location (although 65% remained in original location) and that they no longer had holes in the roof as the new roof sheets (CGIs) were stronger than what they had before. The post-distribution monitoring noted that recipients used the majority of the cash on housing with 46% of money used to make the house stronger (safer) and 41% to make it weatherproof.

 - People's perception of 'firm' is different to that of the PRC/BRC shelter team's evaluation of 'safe'. The team found that 94% of roofs and other elements were weak, very weak or unsafe. Yet people see and experience that their houses are firmer relative to the make-shift houses that they lived in post-Haiyan (see photo on page).
 - Highlighting that people do not live in sector boxes or silos, participants in the group interviews prioritized both positive and negative changes to their lives outside of shelter in income including hunger, fewer fish, as well as improvements in disaster preparedness and hygiene. A range of actors contributed to these changes including Haiyan herself who damaged fish stock and mangroves but also provided a reminder of the importance of disaster preparedness as well as ADRA, DSWD, municipal and barangay officials and PRC/BRC livelihood, WASH and DRR teams.
- Other changes that people ranked lower in importance and less frequently:** People also reported other changes such as having more space and comfort, relative to before and after Haiyan as well as sleeping better, especially during storms and rains. People also reported to a limited

extent less financial stress due to assistance from multiple sources (PRC/BRC SRA, DSWD, Bayan Muna and Save the Children)

For the future participants in the shelter repair assistance groups equally prioritized finishing, reinforcing and maintaining their houses, each being recommended in 6 of the 9 groups. This indicates an understanding of the risk of future disasters and need for maintenance.



4.1.2 Core shelter

Initially with Disasters Emergency Committee funds, the British and Philippines Red Cross planned to *reconstruct 500 dwellings with improved physical durability to hazards* with Houses are rebuilt to recommended humanitarian specifications⁵ (appropriate to context) able to withstand 310 km wind speed and 7.2 Earthquake magnitude. However, with Disasters Emergency Committee funds 1004 core shelters have been completed (1004 with completed latrines). According to a study commissioned by the Technical Working Group the shelters can withstand up to 200 kph winds (this document was not available to the evaluation).



Due to constraints in logistics and human resources, few core shelters were built in 2014, with only 95 houses reported as complete by February 2015, about 15 months after Haiyan. The rate of completed shelters increased rapidly throughout 2015.

The core shelter and latrine is a very significant benefit with a total value of about Php100,800/£1,440, or almost 2 years income for a small farmer or fish vendor⁶. The core shelter itself costs Php70,560/£1,008 and the associated latrine costs Php30,240/ £432⁷. The cost of the PRC/BRC core

⁵ This is a quote from the proposal.

⁶ Approximated from end-line survey


⁷ Figures based on final report to Disasters Emergency Committee

shelter program is comparable to the cost of the government core shelter relocation option available to LGU as part of a DSWD program⁸. The DSWD has a relocation package equivalent to Php70,000

According to their own shelter guidelines PRC should select beneficiaries whose houses were destroyed; as well as with vulnerability and exclusion factors relating to land ownership and location.

Participatory group interviews - Core Shelter

The evaluation team facilitated 10 groups discussions with a total of 145 core shelter beneficiaries. 80% of participants were women. The groups discussed and ranked the main changes to their lives, factors which contributed to those changes and plans relating to the Red Cross assistance. It is important to note that in line with the level of assistance people reported high levels of changes.



Participants in the core shelter groups reported a significant number of changes to their lives, relating to shelter, the most significant are

3. The most frequently cited and most heavily weighted change was not directly attributable to the core shelter program but related to recovered livelihoods, schooling, scholarships and increase awareness of disasters and damage to the livelihood ecosystem by Haiyan. This is an interesting finding as Core Shelter is a significant benefit. In the opinion of the evaluator this is indicative of good targeting, as houses that were poorly constructed or constructed using cheap and weak material were owned by poor and vulnerable people. Within this group the ability to meet daily needs is a high priority.
4. **Increased independence and privacy (including for latrine)** - before receiving the core shelter, 84% of people lived in make shift shelters⁹ whilst some lived with friends, relatives, and a small number rented. Some people reported that they needed to split their family for the two-years until they received the core shelter. People rate regaining their independence highest. According to the end-line assessment 93% of houses are occupied by only one family.

⁸ <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/140624%20Region%20VI%20cluster%20meeting%20minutes.pdf>


⁹ Core shelter endline assessment, February 2016

5. **More and better space than their previous *shanty* temporary shack** - people were happy with the space, compliant with the minimum SPHERE standard, noting that it was larger and better than the make-shift shelter within which 84% of people lived in since Haiyan.
6. **Better sleep as less leaks, not sleeping on ground** - People reported getting better sleep, citing not sleeping on the ground (with carton) or dealing with leaking roofs. This was frequent and highly rated by the groups.
7. **Feeling safe as shelter is weather proof and firm** - People place importance in having a weatherproof house for comfort as well as protecting appliances. Home owners rated the roof as highest but had initial concerns relating to leaks through the wall and windows, later adapted by PRC/BRC. In the end-line assessment 96% suggested improvement to the wall with 75% noting rain could get in or it was easily broken.
8. People also noted that they have **reduced financial pressure**, and are not going into debt to repair or build a new house as well as not having a significant and regular repair bill for their previous houses.

Other changes that people ranked lower in importance and less frequently: A smaller number of people reported improved family bonds and community solidarity with families being re-united within their new home.

It is also important to note that according to the post-distribution monitoring, 30% of houses moved location mostly less than 100 meters and 9% have PWD living in house (mental illness, blind, deaf, down syndrome and polio) whilst 6% have a pregnant women living in the house. In 2015, the shelter technical working group approved a ramp design for core shelter.

People have plans for their core house. The core house is designed to be extended and adapted. People's main plan for extension is the kitchen, and extending the porch is also popular. Internally, people plan to create a division to provide a private bedroom area.



The most frequently stated plan is to replace or repair structural elements, mostly walls and windows. Finance allowing, it is preferred to replace this with concrete or hollow blocks but if not people plan to make double walls. According to the end-line assessment people believe it is their responsibility to maintain the shelter and 45% received information on how to maintain the house. People also have plans to protect the main elements of the house using paint, Solignum, varnish and used oil.

In terms of longevity people feel that the CGI sheets and the foundation will last up to 20 years and are of high quality. Whereas coco-lumber – and especially young coco-lumber - could last 5 years if maintained and kept dry but is already deteriorating, especially the exposed and wet comfort room (latrine). When asked about how long they think the house will last, people mentally break down the house into

its main components. This indicates that people consider re-using parts of the house and replacing components which have a shorter life-span.

4.1.3 Conclusions - Shelter assistance

- The shelter repair assistance, with a value of Php15,000/£215¹⁰ *helped with other efforts get a roof over peoples head* in 2014 but did not meet targets or basic standards for safety and resilience. However, along with other non-Red Cross assistance, the shelter repair assistance did contribute to helping people waterproof and strengthen their partially damaged homes. Shelters were not repaired using build back safer techniques. This in part was caused by limited sharing of information on how to “Build Back Safer” including inadequate IEC materials, low engagement of build back safer champions, or appropriate levels of technical support around distribution & monitoring. The shelter team is now planning an additional round of support that will focus on adequately sharing information on how to “Build Back Safer”, which includes an additional financial support of PHP1,000 for the purchase of hardware items.
- Core shelter, which had an occupancy rate of 94¹¹%, is the biggest investment of Php100,800/£1440 per beneficiary, evoked the biggest changes to people’s lives, by helping them regain independence, privacy and sleep better. People feel the shelter is safer and weatherproof. In addition, people feel that the core shelter is *firmer*, structurally safer and (mostly) weatherproof, protecting them and their belongings.
- People understand and embrace the core shelter concept and have plans for extensions (kitchens and porch) as well as an understanding its limited longevity. Additionally, if people have the money they would replace walls and windows with weatherproof and long-lasting materials, for example concrete blocks. People plan to maintain their shelters and understand the longevity issues of coco-lumber, especially relating to exposure to water and the weather. This was especially noted for the coco-lumber in the latrine which people do not expect to last long, even with maintenance and treatment.
- About 9% of households include people with a variety of disabilities. This highlights the need to adapt the shelter design for ramps (wheelchair) and hand-rails (blind, elderly).
- High occupancy rates indicate that people who needed core shelters received core shelters, based on damage assessments.

4.1.4 Recommendations - Shelter assistance

Current program, transition or immediate study

- The current program should invest in a follow-up initiative to allow accessibility to shelters & latrines for persons with disabilities (up to 9% of total), perhaps using an additional 2016 distribution package for additional strengthening of earlier shelter repair packages. It should be noted that in 2015, the shelter technical working group approved adapted core shelter designs including ramps for wheelchair access as well as adapted designs improving access to latrines for disabled.

¹⁰ The shelter repair assistance package included a PHP10,000 grant and 10 CGI roofing sheets

¹¹ According to an End-line survey of 30 core houses in February 2016

- Depending on chapter's evolving capacity, the RC143 system, the Philippine Red Cross should further invest in training community builders in PASSA/build back safer and pre-positioning for future emergencies the IFRC emergency shelter kits. This could link with the IFRC "IFRC Shelter Kit Training", which may be used by Philippines Red Cross in 2016¹². After the disaster, these resilience building trainings should be done at the earliest possible opportunity, especially for those involved in reconstruction. These training and the PASSA process is important for communities to increase resilience not just using Red Cross assistance but also rebuilding from individual and community resources as well as assistance from other actors.
- The shelter technical working group should commission a study in order to learn for future disasters, to understand if shelters built using Red Cross shelter repair assistance, outside Ajuy and Belasan, had similar issues with safety and poor quality repair. This study should be similar to the report on Post Distribution Monitoring on Building Quality carried out in September 2015 by the Ajuy team that focused on the shelter repair assistance. The study could use the Iloilo program as a possible counterfactual to the efficacy of PASSA/Build Back Safer training and IEC materials.

Preparing for future emergencies

- In future disasters, PASSA training should be done at the earliest possible opportunity to contribute to not just Red Cross supported safer reconstruction but all. This is a very low cost action.
- The core shelter guidance note should be updated to allow for ease of replacement of different structural elements, especially roofing; to ensure that elements are waterproof and include a locally derived maintenance kit, based on local construction techniques and materials.
- The shelter program should before and immediately after a large disaster maintain contracts with preferred suppliers to provide seasoned/dried lumber or timber. The type of timber to be used should be decided by the technical working groups considering large scale availability, cost, longevity, environmental impact and local techniques and preferences.
- For future emergencies, the core shelter technical working group should in their guidelines include process to identified needs of persons with disabilities as well as standard adaption kits for people with a variety of disabilities or the elderly such as ramps, hand-rails or easier access to Latrines¹³. It is noted that in 2015, the Shelter Technical Working Group approved a new ramp design.

¹² Detailed knowledge this was outside the scope of the evaluation

¹³ See <http://www.didrn.net/home/> for further contacts in the region

4.2 Findings for livelihoods

Initially the Livelihood assistance targeted *3000 Individuals within vulnerable groups (farmers, fisher folk, small business owners) to be supported in meeting immediate/short-medium term income needs.* By the end of the program the British and Philippines Red Cross had supported 5,178 individuals within these groups with DEC funds. In addition, the program helped these individuals establish 243 micro-enterprise savings groups which has grown from people's own efforts, supported by PRC/BRC and in January 2016, had almost £50,000 in savings accounts. The program also supported 1696 farmers with both crop insurance for one cropping and life and accident insurance for one year. Farmers also formed three savings groups under with PRC/BRC support. 18 small cash for work community projects were also completed.

The intervention targeted small-scale farmers, fisher folk and small business owners. Each recipient received a grant of Php10,000/£143 based on proposals as well as some additional skills training and support in establishing savings groups. This targeting criteria (farmers, fisher folk and small business owners) defined selection. The selection process was informed by focus group discussions and supported by community assemblies.

PRC updated its livelihood guidelines in January 2015. These updated guidelines include learnings from innovations in saving groups and crop insurance piloted by the Iloilo team. These guidelines are expressed in the following phases (note all phases were funded by Disasters Emergency Committee thus not included in the evaluation) :

- Phase 1. Household level livelihood interventions
- Phase 2. Skills training and enterprise development
- Phase 3. Community level livelihood interventions

In addition to the DEC funded elements the livelihoods program also invested in farming lessons for 162 people, marketable skills training for 295 people, and 25 additional community cash for work projects.

4.2.1 *Micro-Enterprise*


The micro-enterprise program targeted almost exclusively women, providing training, a cash grant of Php10,000/£143, initiatives to support access to markets (trade fairs etc.) and support to establish saving groups. The groups are self-forming and selected in part based on proposals to PRC/BRC.

Baseline (July-September 2014) and end line assessments (end of 2015) showed that targeted households have multiple sources of income. Much of the income supported in micro-enterprise groups relates to secondary sources reported by households - such as catering, vending and sari-sari stores. Base and end-line surveys also show that about half of all households have income that varies a lot (>30%) or medium amounts (20-30%) every month. Thus the absolute figures for income and debt from the base and end-lines are not used in this report.

Participatory group interviews: Micro-enterprise

Participants in the Micro-Enterprise groups reported a significant number of changes to their lives, relating to their enterprises and lives, the most significant are

- Better life with less financial problems for food and medicine with renewed income and savings** - By far the most frequent and highest ranked change was in relation to people having less financial stress and problems due to recovering business and incomes. People highlighted that not being able to pay for food and medicine caused the most stress. This benefit is also reflected in other changes relating to paying school allowance and savings for future emergencies big and small. The base and end-line assessments highlight that buying additional food would be peoples number one priority if they have increased income. The end-line survey reported that 96% of respondents did *not suffer family members unable to eat at home due to lack of food in the last 7 days*, which is an improvement from 87% in baseline survey. It is important to note that these figures are important to indicate snap-shots of overall food security issues but it is the evaluator's opinion that they have very limited comparable value as food scarcity is dependent on seasonal issues related to harvests, irregular incomes and expenses. Other frequently-cited priorities in both the end and base line include paying school allowance (second in both), paying bills and buying medicine and house repairs. It should be noted that most households have more than one source of mostly irregular income. Participants in the group interviews reported that a number of factors contributed to this positive change, including PRC/BRC micro-enterprise grants, training and support to savings groups. In terms of non-project contributions people highlighted the importance of a recovery in business environment, the negative effect of Haiyan on long term fish stocks and assistance from groups such as DSWD, PCI and completing the re-building of one's house (thus reduced expenses).



- Non-attributable (to PRC/BRC livelihoods) changes in shelter, and damage to mangroves / fish stock** - The second most frequently cited and ranked change relating to people's lives were not directly attributable to Red Crosses livelihood initiatives. These included negative impacts on fish stocks and mangrove damage due to Haiyan as well as support from Zoological Society of London (ZSL) on this issue. In the end-line assessment 64% of fishermen say they catch less now than after Haiyan. Similarly, people noted that PRC/BRC DRM team and Haiyan herself contributed to changed attitudes towards Typhoons and preparedness. Significantly PRC/BRC shelter repair and core shelter assistance reduced expenses in home repairs to those who received it. According to the base-line assessment 14% of income was spent on house repairs.
- Able to expand or diversify business - using new skills, markets and capital and in the future savings** - Some groups have or are diversifying and expanding businesses, mostly relating to catering and vending. In addition, the most frequent future plan for micro-enterprise groups is to expand or invest in new businesses using money built up in the savings accounts. Groups attributed this expansion to improving orders, demand from produce and their own work. In addition, for expansion, groups highlighted the importance of management and other skills training including access to trade fairs.

4. **Recovered business** - A similar number of groups highlighted recovered business as an important change, with businesses relating to fishing. These group cited a wider range of assistance (mostly for fishing equipment) from PRC/BRC, their own efforts, DSWD, CARITAS, ADRA and Coup de Pouce.
5. **Having savings for emergencies big and small** - The groups emphasizes the importance of learning to save and use that savings for big and small emergencies with medical bills and food cited as important. People attributed this change to PRC/BRC supported saving groups. As of January 2016, there are 148 registered DOLE groups (3 of which are farmer groups) with savings in January of almost ₱50,000 (3,398,992 PHP) which is an increase over 4 months from September 2015 of 8%. Discussions during interviews indicate that although a few people still struggle to understand and – importantly - have confidence in saving and loans groups and dynamics, this understanding and confidence is building over-time as withdrawals are made, and first dividends paid to the group. Although not deliberately measured, group interviews did not indicate any significant confusion about group rules, beyond isolated cases.

Other changes that people ranked lower in importance and less frequently: Able to pay school allowance - According to the baseline few families cannot afford to send their children to school, only 2%. However, paying school allowances for uniforms, extra classes such as computing is important. **Reducing or eliminating debt** - the reduction of debt was highlighted as a secondary importance. In conflict with this finding, the end and base-line analysis showed increases in debt in the month before the assessment. However, about half of household income varies significantly month on month, and thus snapshots of incomes and debts from the baseline and end-line survey are unreliable, especially as they were conducted at different times of the fishing/farming seasons. **Solidarity** manifested as sharing blessings, learning from one another and shared responsibility was also cited as a change. This mostly related to PRC/BRC and other NGO meetings and seminars as well as shared responsibility in savings groups.


A note on indicators for change: It is the opinion of the evaluator (and part of one conclusion) that income, expenditure and debt should be measured over a seasonal timeline. In addition, important proxy indicators should align with people's priorities and a household's ability to pay for expenses such as additional school expenses (beyond the free school system for additional classes), health expenses (beyond free medical care/medicine), food types consumed (meat especially pork and condiments over rice), housing repairs and investments in business or other asset purchase/sale. These proxy indicators can be cross referenced with institutions and other surveys of schools, clinics/BHW, markets (food and housing repairs), and business loan groups (such as rural banks). There is likely to be a significant body of work from government (income and expenditure surveys), and institutions (banks, insurance companies and NGO) relating to these indicators.

Future plans - micro-enterprise groups:

Micro-enterprise groups and individuals plan to expand and invest in a diverse range of new businesses using savings.

Almost all groups emphasized that they plan to continue the savings groups and to continue to work as an association. A few groups noted risks from other savings group members leaving with a small minority still trying to understand the benefits of savings as the group's first dividends are shared. As was a finding of the Mid-term report, these groups require continued support from micro-finance institutions or NGO's for a number of years. This is an ongoing discussion within the livelihood team and forms part of recommendations below.

Graph 10 - Future plans for 10 microenterprise groups





4.2.2 Rice Farmers

The PRC/BRC livelihood initiative targeted small rice farmers (with less than 1 hectare) and supported them with training, a cash grant of Php10,000/£143, and paying and promoting crop insurance and an associated Accident and life insurance. This cash grant assistance targeted a total of 1,807 farmers. Additionally, PRC/BRC paid for 1 round of crop insurance for 1696 farmers for one cropping as well as accident and life insurance for one year. PRC/BRC also supported trainings and collaborations with the Department of Agriculture from which farmers mostly remember “how to use the correct pesticide”.

Note on base and end-line assessments: Baseline (July-September 2014) and end line assessments (end of 2015) show that targeted households have multiple sources of income. For farmers this income is highly variable according to the seasonal calendar, with almost two-thirds stating that income varied a lot month-on-month. Most households have more than 1 source of income, with people stating in participatory group interviews that debt is reducing and income increasing. The base and end-line surveys showed the opposite but only looked at the previous month’s income as were carried out at different points of the seasonal calendar. Thus the absolute figures for income and debt from the base and end-lines are not used in this report. Similarly, the end and baseline indicated that the average harvest before and after Haiyan was significantly lower, dropping from about 37 to 20 but with an enormous range of between 3 and 105 sacks per farm. There is also recall differences between the base and end-line. This figures are not used in the report as the type of farming, inputs, seeds, irrigation and use of insurance is not detailed, especially noting that this is an El Nino year.

Participants in the Farmers group interviews reported a significant number of changes to their lives, relating to their farming and lives, the most significant are

1. **Normalized harvest by receiving assistance/inputs from PRC/BRC, FAO, Department of Agriculture and others:** Farmers require significant finance to buy seeds, repairs to irrigation, tools, fertilizer, pesticides, labour and other inputs to plant rice. With up to 5 harvests every 2 years for irrigated farms the risks involved in getting a good return on investment is high. Participants of the farmers groups emphasized a wide range of hazards that they face from Typhoons, flash floods, water shortages, El Nino's, La Nina, pest infestations, rice price (in)stability, dengue and hunger. PRC/BRC provided inputs, and training and advice to farmers along with farmer's longer term partners in the department of agriculture and other post-Haiyan supporters FAO and DSWD.
2. **Repaired, invested or received shelter assistance:** The second major change reported in the participatory group interviews was repairs to shelter. Shelters were repaired by a combination of



household income (in part from harvests), support from DSWD as well as PRC/BRC assistance (initial blanket distribution, SRA and CORE house).

Other changes that people ranked lower in importance and less frequently: Reduction or stabilisation of debts: Participants report that debt was reduced or stabilised in part due to the fact that with assistance from PRC/BRC farmers did not need to borrow money to buy inputs to re-plant rice. The end-line survey shows that 68% of farmers have debt and 60% took out new loans in the two months before the survey (end of 2015) mostly from neighbours, family or informal lending sources. 37% of debt was for farm inputs and 27% for food. **Able to pay school allowance** - According to the baseline, few families cannot afford to send their children to school, only 2%. However, paying school allowances for uniforms, extra classes such as computer is important. In the end-line survey 37% say if they had more income they would spend it on school expenses and that 5% of new debt in the last two months was for school expenses. **Non-attributable changes in attitude towards preparedness:** This change in attitude, taking typhoons more seriously is attributed mainly to Haiyan herself.

Training and new skills

Training and new skills did not score highly on changes which have happened. In part, this may be due to a number of trainings and support from the Department of Agriculture. The end-line assessment showed that the only significant recall, at 80% of respondents from the trainings was “*how to use correct pesticide*”. Other areas of lower recall include clearing of dikes, replanting methods, seeding techniques, water source management, selecting seed variety, using hay for fertiliser, organic farming techniques, planting black rice, applying fertiliser, cultivation of soil and monitoring the rice field. It should be noted that the team worked within the framework of other information and training providers, recognising that farmers have multiple sources of information such as from the Department of Agriculture and FAO.

However, applying new skills was the fourth most frequent response to future plans, with one farmer considering to return to organic farming.

Crop insurance

A brief look at the range and frequency of hazard events which farmers face and the costs and risks of continual investments in inputs for uncertain harvest yields would indicate that even for small scale farmers crop insurance is an ideal risk sharing mechanism.


The insurance company has six packages of insurance for farmers and fishers, and focuses on marginalised farmers with <3ha or land. In total in Region 6, the insurance company reports 209,550 policies of which 70,000 are in Iloilo. The crop coverage paid for by PRC/BRC covers damage by typhoon, pest and diseases as well as accident and life insurance. BRC/PRC payment for insurance premiums was delayed and the insurance company covered this expense for a cropping cycle using its own resources. Then, using the delayed payment PRC/BRC paid for the next cropping cycle. The insurance package requires adherence to good farming practices such as choice of seed varieties (these are aligned with the department of Agricultural). Red Cross paid crop insurance covered 169 farms for one cropping cycle. From that cycle, farmers made 22 claims as of 02/23/2015 . In additional Red Cross also paid for accident and life insurance covering 169 farmers for 1 year.

According to the baseline survey before Hai-yan only 8% had crop insurance and 14% had considered taking out a policy. After the project 24% reported re-applying for crop insurance on their own. Of those who did not the following reasons were given:

- about 50% reported lack of information or confusion or delay in the process.
- 39% were excluded or refused as they did not have an irrigation system with an appropriate water supply.

Crop insurance is a long term, appropriate risk sharing mechanism. It was reported that the German Red Cross is collaborating with the Insurance company based on experience with the British Red Cross project.

Graph 13 - Reasons why rice farmer did not take up crop insurance (end-line assessment)



4.2.3 Cash for work community projects

In total, PRC/BRC supported 18 community cash for work projects, with DEC funds, employing for a short period of time 418 people. The CFW projects were implemented through the PRC/BRC micro-enterprise conduit organisations. One project focused on tree planting, all others on dike construction. The projects paid a local minimum wage of Php285/£4.07 per day for up to 15 days.

The participatory group interviews did not highlight any significant change due to the cash for work program, with people in the groups focusing on changes to their longer term livelihoods and shelter. However, people recognised the importance of income to people, albeit for a short period of time. The level of income was not sufficient to lead to a significant change akin to other aspects of the program.

The projects were focused on cash for work and not resilience building. PRC/BRC disaster risk reduction team completed community vulnerability and capacity assessments after the cash for work projects were completed. The participatory group interviews and community vulnerability and capacity assessments both highlight that medicine as well as water for irrigation and drinking are key issues relating to resilience.

4.2.4 Conclusions – Livelihoods

Note: The evaluation was not able to triangulate findings relating to changes in income and debt. Finding from the evaluation's group interviews contradict those of the end-line survey.. Thus the evaluation cannot draw evidence based triangulated conclusions but does recommend other methodologies and processes for deeper understanding of these critical and complex issues.

- Markets and weather are a defining factors in the success of farming interventions but the Red Cross Php10,000/£143 grant (about 2 months income) helped rice farmers *normalise* by supporting some of the inputs (equipment/seeds/fertilisers etc.) needed for one cropping. Whereas, the same support to micro-enterprise groups helped some recover their businesses but allowed others to expand or plan for expansion and diversification driven by access to markets, demand for their produce as well as capital in the form of 243 PRC/BRC supported saving groups - now valued at almost £50,000 or approximately an average of £205 per saving groups.
- People value savings as a buffer for future large and small emergencies including hospitalisation, food shortages/crop failures and future disasters, savings now stand at about £12.50 (a week's income) per person.
- The support to micro-enterprise groups contributed people have less financial stress especially for purchasing food, medicine and school allowances. Additionally, members of the savings groups can access capital to expand or diversify their businesses in addition to emergency needs. This strategy promotes individual household resiliency and a reduction in debt.
- Crop insurance is highly relevant to the hazard profile of farmers but remains confusing and bureaucratically challenging to small-scale farmers.
- The small cash for work program, initiated before community VCAs provided a small income to people for a short period of time but little significant change. Targeted beneficiaries did not receive cash support and are households that are dependent on casual labour.
- The evaluation and different end-line and other studies provided conflicting data relating to income and debt reduction. Those interviewed for this evaluation reported a reduction or elimination in debt whereas the base and end lines show an increase in debt at the periods of the survey.

4.2.5 Recommendations - Livelihoods

- The Technical Working Group should initiate a specialist study on the dynamics of income and debt for farmers, fisher folk and other targeted groups to inform outcome-level indicators for future recoveries. This needs to be based on a multi-year seasonal calendar. It should start with a desk review of government reports on household income and expenditure reports as well as existing studies on income and debt for small scale farmers and fisher folk. The study should be carried out by a sector specialist. The aim of the study is to understand the best forms of recovery interventions, their timing and tools for resilience building (e.g. within micro-finance) available to Philippine Red Cross.
- Iloilo Red Cross (chapter) should ensure that micro-enterprise savings groups receive additional organisational support from a micro-enterprise financial institution or rural bank. PRC/BRC livelihood team is currently looking at suitable institutions. It is important to note that the driver is market and demand for produce or diversification rather than increase in savings thus retaining links with LGU is important.
- Crop insurance is highly relevant but confusing and bureaucratic in its current format. The Philippine Red Cross should seek, through a long term PNS, to establish links with micro-finance institutions for insurance with farmers, learning from experience outside Philippines to see if paramedic insurance or other innovation in farming associations can be incorporated into future recovery. Insurance is a long term but critical resilience building tool.

4.3 Defining decisions and processes

The aim of this section is to explore key decisions or processes which defined what the program did.

4.3.1 Centralised decision-making

The Philippine Red Cross centralised decisions relating to location as well as scale and type of interventions defined the program. This allowed the Philippines Red Cross to take control of a large and complex operation, but largely defined what was done, where and how. However, it is important to note that the Iloilo program did go beyond defined program adding aspects such as group savings, crop insurance and changes to core shelter. Many of these changes are included in updated guidelines for use in future emergencies.

A 4-month recovery assessment was largely unused and had little impact on the program design.

The Philippine Red Cross in coordination with its Partner National Societies including British Red Cross decided that the program would be in Iloilo, which was one of 10 affected provinces/chapters. In key informant interviews almost all recognised that the Philippine Red Cross had an *obligation (as one of the largest humanitarian organisations in the Philippines) to respond at an appropriate scale covering all affected chapters/provinces and not just the most affected*. The British Red Cross initially planned to work in 7 municipalities in Iloilo. After an initial assessment it was found that beneficiaries numbers and Philippine Red Cross goals could be met in two municipalities, Ajuy and Balasan.

Philippine Red Cross in Manila centralised established a Haiyan recovery unit operating largely in parallel to the existing local chapters. The Philippine Red Cross established Technical Working Groups (TWGs) with PNS for sector coordination covering all areas, in effect defining what would be done in communities. The TWG sets standards expressed in guidance notes, with any adaptations requiring recommendation from the TWG to the Secretary General of the Philippines Red Cross for approval. These guidance notes are based on Philippine Red Cross previous experiences, The guidelines continue to evolve based on learnings from the Haiyan operation.

In February 2014, the Philippine Red Cross set out a Movement Wide Operational Framework (MWOFF) setting three pillars for collective action including: -

1. Shared operational objectives, priorities and common approaches
2. Working effectively together as a Red Cross Red Crescent movement with internal and external partners through strong co-ordination mechanisms
3. Quality and accountability.

This common framework centralised decision-making, goals and targets for all Philippines Red Cross work. Coordinating contributions from 136 participating national societies, 15 in-country together with IFRC and ICRC¹⁴, was a challenge, stated by many.

4.3.2 Integrated programing

The program was not an integrated program but one in which sectors operated in parallel, separately selecting and communicating with beneficiaries. The evaluation did not find evidence of significant sharing or processes between sectors to adapt or refocus benefits between sectors, such as providing additional livelihood focus to people without land rights or in no-build zones. This approach of parallel

¹⁴ Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan, One-year progress report, International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 2014.

programmes also created additional work-load with parallel selection and communication processes. This was more challenging considering the failure of the Barangay Recovery committees (see findings section 2).

Centralised goals contributed to parallel and almost independent sector programmes. This was not just in the Iloilo program as the IFRC Mid-Term Review in August 2015 expressing ***“The Operation aimed to adopt an integrated approach to recovery programming, guided by ‘one plan, one team, and one operation model’ with the intention being that sectors would work in close partnership to coordinate activities within communities. But the approach was more akin to ‘parallel programming’ with the different sectors working alongside each other (to varying degrees of effectiveness) rather than in fully connected ways”***.

4.3.4 Support systems

This centralised structure with standard interventions and centralised goal setting largely defined what would happen in communities. Almost all, interviews with Red Cross staff at all levels recognised the success of this structure to achieving a coordinated program at an appropriate scale. This is a significant achievement considering the enormous relative growth in the size of the Philippines Red Cross program. However, over 80% also expressed a reservation that quality and resilience building may have been sacrificed to achieve scale, especially given the limitations on field teams to adapt programmes to the local context.

Support systems and centralisation of decision-making and delays awaiting authorisation from Manila resulted in significant delays ***and is also the biggest potential change that would improve future programmes***. Almost all key informant interviews with Red Cross staff in London, Manila, Iloilo and Ajuy emphasized strongly that ***support systems, designed for smaller developmental programmes were the biggest challenge and hindrance to programming***. This manifested in long delays in procurements, challenges in getting authorisations for contracts and community projected as well as very limited financial authorisations in Iloilo and Ajuy.

Very significantly, delays due to bureaucratic procedures affected staff occupancy levels¹⁵. In risk management reporting the risks of finding suitable candidates, delays in contracting, procurement, burn-out and payments were initially orange then red flagged as highest risk. These challenges were compounded as British Red Cross had no formal partnership status so could neither hire staff locally nor open bank accounts on its own.

However, the evaluation notes the enormous challenges to scaling up a program with high level of competition from NGO and government for certain profiles, candidates and materials. This is an enormous expansion which would challenge any organisation.

The Philippine Red Cross commissioned a review of reportedly outdated program support systems which is not yet available for consideration within the evaluation.

This challenge was not limited to the Iloilo program noting that the August 2015 IFRC mid-term review recognises that *“there have been some limitations in the Operation. Most of these relate to delayed implementation of activities caused by lack of materials, lengthy decision-making protocols etc., but given the overall context and scale in which the Operation has taken place these can be considered ‘opportunities for future improvement’ rather than operational failings. . . - An important factor in this discussion is the Philippine Red Cross Chairman’s acknowledgment that one of the greatest challenges to the national society ongoing development is its own “bureaucracy”¹⁶. This acknowledgement is significant and a key step in addressing inefficiencies.*

¹⁵ Occupancy rate information in the table relates to April 2015, SUMMARY DATA - PRC BRC staffing calculations

¹⁶ August 2015 IFRC mid-term review

4.3.5 Conclusions for defining decisions and processes

- The Philippine Red Cross successfully led and coordinated a large one-movement wide output driven “*one size fits all*” program with limited flexibility for adaption to the local context.
- The Philippines Red Cross centralised decision-making in parallel to the pre-existing program.
- The programme’s greatest hindrance is also the single most effective opportunity for improvement in future responses - the Philippines Red Cross support systems.
- The DEC program was driven by outputs focused on individuals and households and not communities level programs. This contributed to sector teams working largely in parallel without sharing possible solutions to community issues of resilience, land rights and no-build zones. Later, non-DEC funded, community led DRR and WASH programming focused more on community resilience building.

4.3.6 Recommendations for defining decisions and processes


- The planned Philippines Red Cross meta-evaluation should focus on changes to the Philippines Red Cross guidance notes, recognising that most Haiyan staff are contractual and thus only some will be available for future emergencies.
- All the sector, Philippines Red Cross guidance notes should have a range of benefits which can be adapted to each context using pre-defined adaption criteria.
- National sector technical working groups should be maintained as an owner of knowledge but also include a group focusing on strategies and outcome-level resilience building indicators and sequencing of actions.
- For future emergencies, management and support systems should be re-organised to function as close as possible to where the impact of that decision would be felt or gained. This would improve transparency, efficiency and effectiveness. There are multiple tried and tested models designed for organisations with both development and humanitarian operations that are also accepted by a range of donors. It is understood Philippines Red Cross commissioned a study to this issue.

4.4 Community processes

The Philippines Red Cross updated guidance note "STEPS TO BARANGAY RECOVERY COMMITTEE FORMATION", guides that the following steps should be completed with the Barangay Recovery committee:

- Step 0: Inform Barangay leaders for a barangay meeting with Red Cross
- Step 1: Barangay Recovery Committee Orientation
- Step 2: Define Impact of Typhoon Haiyan in the Barangay
- Step 3: Discussion on the Most Vulnerable yet to Recover
- Step 4: Defining Vulnerability Criteria
- Step 5: Mapping of the Most Vulnerable
- Step 6: Defining Roles and Responsibilities of Barangay Recovery Committee
- Step 7: Community Consultation/Validation
- Step 8: Household Validation and Finalisation

Due to challenges with the formation of the Barangay Recovery Committees, the Shelter and Livelihoods teams adapted the process to select beneficiaries. The Shelter program selected people through surveys, mostly housing damage surveys. The Red Cross with Barangay officials then developed and updated lists of selected beneficiaries, to be refined and validated by the Red Cross. The Livelihood program conducted a number of focus group discussions and community assemblies to define, select and communicate their program.





The Iloilo team communicated with communities mostly via a network of Red Cross Volunteers from the local area, who were recruited for the recovery program. The Iloilo team established a complaint mechanism with a hotline, displayed in each community.

The evaluation team facilitated 22 participatory group interviews discussing the actual and (community suggested) best ways for people and PRC/BRC to communicate, as well as improve participation in the program design and delivery. Importantly, these participatory group discussions also explored community perspectives on beneficiary selection and peoples' knowledge of the barangay recovery committee's and RC143 initiative.

The 22 groups were separated by sex and included a total of 229 people both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (36%).

4.4.1 Knowing the Red Cross program

In participatory group interviews people’s **suggested best ways** to get to know about Red Cross programmes should be through the **barangay officials and Capitan, community assemblies and face-to-face interactions with Red Cross staff and volunteers**. Men and women differed in their preferences. Men suggested that the best way to know about the Red Cross program was through community assemblies and face-to-face interactions with PRC/BRC staff. However, women felt the best way to know of the program was through Barangay Capitan, officials and health workers.





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¹⁷ Note some groups stated BGY officials and Captains separately as well as RC volunteers and staff separately – the evaluation added these together to get frequency of response

In participatory group interviews both men and women cited that most frequent ways that people said they got to know of the PRC/BRC program was face-to-face encounters with PRC/BRC volunteers and staff as well as through barangay officials and Capitan. People also reporting hearing of the program through media, mainly the radio but also mentioned was social media such as Facebook, community assemblies and gossip. Women also reported hearing about the program through Barangay officials than men whereas reported attending more assemblies than women.


4.4.2 Communicating with *(Ajuy) Red Cross*:



Both men and women most frequently suggested that the **best way to communicate with Red Cross is through face-to-face communications in the Red Cross office (referred to as walk-in's - although many hired jeeps and buses to come), as well as face-to-face communications through volunteers or with Barangay officials.**

Both men and women said that *walking into* PRC/BRC Ajuy offices was both the best way and most frequently used way for people to communicate (on program implementation issues) with PRC/BRC. Interestingly Red Cross Ajuy team does not have a system to manage this process.

Calling or texting the hotline was cited as the second most frequent actual way to communication with PRC/BRC but only the fourth suggested best way. More than 60% of the 325 texts/calls recorded on the hotline were relating to beneficiary lists and selection, with 30% being a diverse range of questions, comments or statements. The complaints/comments were passed on to the relevant sector, and only 9 comments remain open. Information from the hotline contributed to various workshops and initiatives to redefine and clarify selection processes especially relating to shelter.



4.4.3 People’s participation in programs

The pre-defined nature of the program and benefits did not facilitate people’s involvement in the design of the interventions.


However, the program did have some adaptations during the program delivery. Livelihoods and shelter interventions are defined by the guidance notes with established benefits for all of Philippine Red Cross programmes not just in Iloilo. Beneficiaries did report that cash components allowed them to prioritise their own purchases. Cash was included both in the shelter repair assistance package (PHP 10,000/£143 plus CGI roofing sheets) as well as livelihood interventions (PHP10,000/£143 plus trainings). Some beneficiaries also reported that the core shelter reacted to a number of suggested adaptations in for example change in materials using plywood instead of Sawali, or the window design. Other PRC/BRC interventions, out-side the Disasters Emergency Committee funded program, such as DRR and WASH use methodologies which allow people to participate and define priorities.

When asked for ways in which people could give input to the program, both men and women said the main way was to be selected through forming associations, getting selected or assisting PRC/BRC in household interviews for selection. This is unsurprising given that the benefits of the shelter and livelihoods assistance is pre-defined and thus getting selected is the best way to give input into how to spend the cash part of that assistance.

Similarly, people saw face-to-face interactions with volunteers and staff as opportunities to adapt the program along with attending assemblies.

Interestingly, when asked for the best ways to give input or adapt the program people especially men stated that establishing a new business, association or savings group was key, most likely as men see this as a precursors to becoming a micro-enterprise beneficiary (98% of which are women).

4.4.4 Selection



Philippine Red Cross guidelines on establishing a Barangay Recovery Committee require vulnerability criteria and mapping to be conducted with the Barangay Recovery Committee. Although, Red Cross reports indicate that Barangay Recovery Committee are effective and functional in other areas of the Haiyan response, this was not the case in Ajuy and Balasan. In both men and women participatory group interviews 71% of groups did not know the Barangay recovery committee and 62% of groups had no knowledge of the RC143.

The evaluation was not designed to understand why the barangay recovery committee's system failed in Ajuy and Balasan especially in comparison with other areas. Evaluating why barangay recovery committee's succeeded in other areas would provide more fruitful learnings. However, indications show that the barangay recovery committee system failed due to the false perception that barangay recovery committees role was to select beneficiaries rather than criteria for selection. In addition, challenges in selection resulted from a lack of training for Red Cross staff and volunteers to facilitate and manage community selection processes. The consequences of the lack of a community facilitation skill set, including proper training of PRC/BRC volunteers, was a reoccurring theme in key informant interviews, reports, a workshop on the selection process in September 2015 and the final validation workshop.

The Barangay recovery committee's failed as a process to support selection and thus each sector selected beneficiaries separately based on their own processes and criteria, including conducting extensive surveys. Thus, selection was initiated separately with households in essence completing for benefit and selection. The details of how each section selected people is detailed in the evaluations section three.

How were some people selected for assistance/projects and others not "Nгаа ang iban napilian nga mangin benipisyaryo ngaa ang iban wala.

In the participatory group interviews both men and women said that **conflicts of interest** were the most frequent way in which people were selected to benefit from the program. These conflicts of interest focused on the barangay recovery committees which was initially seen as a selection committee, with many people stating that as a member of the barangay recovery committee's they expected to be automatically selected to benefit.

The second most frequently said way to be selected referred to the "control of information" relating to defining Red Cross conditions for selection and the creation of lists specifically in the creation and changes to beneficiary lists, knowledge of where people are, and what the PRC/BRC exclusion and inclusion criteria are. These criteria, which often differed from PRC/BRC official criteria (see findings section 3), ranged from being a citizen, being part of the (DSWD) 4P's program, having an overseas foreign worker in the family, being excluded as senior citizen, being present during the typhoon, being a single parent, owning a farm, own land, having capital for business, being unemployed, having an income and business and civil status. Similarly, vulnerability criteria such as being poor, indigent and on barangay lists such as the 4Ps were seen as important especially by men.

The third most frequently cited way to be selected was based on damage assessment, mostly for shelter. A number of people said that guiding PRC/BRC volunteers during surveys was important in getting selected. A number of people stated that they were not selected as they were missed or ignored during the survey. Similarly, people, mostly men, frequently stated that selection was based on the house-to-house survey, with people noting that controlling the lists and information between PRC/BRC and the Barangay's was critical.

A few men also stated that they were *just out of luck*, with drawing lots, selection by computer also mentioned as tools relating to luck.

Participatory group interviews - Fairness, did the rightful ones (vulnerable and in need) receive assistance.

Participants in the participatory group interviews, of which 36% were not beneficiaries, after discussing communication, participation and selection were asked to rank fairness relating to selection. Before the facilitators asked for this ranking, the group has discussed in depth different steps in getting to know the program, ways they see as leading to selection and their own knowledge of what actually happened in communities. The facilitators initiated the ranking by asking *Basing on the selection, are all beneficiaries the rightful ones to receive the assistance given? why?*

This is then followed-up by asking people why they think the selection was fair or unfair, that is that all the beneficiaries are the rightful ones who receive assistance.

Overall, people ranked selection as *unfair* with a total score of just 17%, *to the question* that the rightful ones (vulnerable and most in need) did (not) receive assistance. A score of 100% would be totally fair and 0% totally unfair.

64% of all groups stated that they think selection was totally unfair often stating

"they only give priorities to those who are close to them like families, friends and relatives" and "100% of those selected were relatives of Barangay recovery committee's members"

"Not fair because people who badly needed the help did not receive any support from Red Cross" and "those who really needs assistance doesn't receive the help, instead those who have the capacity to recovery were given the assistance"

27% of all groups felt that selection was mostly unfair citing ***"It was fair because I received housing"***. or they were undecided.

Only two groups had the majority of people stating that selection was fair (89%) or totally fair noting that ***"(it was fair) because all affected houses were given assistance"***. Only one group felt selection was 100% fair. This was also the only group to include all beneficiaries. This group added ***"the selection was fair especially for those who receive assistance but then we want that others who still needs the assistance will also be given"***.

It should be noted that the coverage within communities (number of benefit packages to households) varied from 16% to 143%. The average coverage was 63%. Annex 4 details the number of packages per household in each of 57 Barangay's

Through-out the programme PRC/BRC made a number of efforts to improve selection, most notably in reducing the role of the barangay recovery committees from the selection process, relying more on surveys and PRC/BRC decision-making. In a workshop to improve selection, in September 2015, focusing on shelter selection the following gaps were found:

1. No Clear Guidelines (Criteria/Process), recommending that the team must create concrete criteria where inclusion and exclusion is specified
2. Lack of Community Participation, especially noting the need to include and build rapport with barangay officials ahead of time
3. Lack of communication/co-ordination, especially with PRC/BRC staff and orientation's before going to field.
4. Lack of Orientation for PRC/BRC Volunteers.
5. Too much high tech but inaccurate results, recommending that the one who gathers data also interprets the result (this refers to the ODK assessment)

This is in line with 55% of the 325 texts/calls recorded on the hotline were relating to beneficiary lists and selection, as would be normal given the important of selection and the need for validation.

4.4.6 Recommendations for community processes

- (Note - this was developed during the validation workshop) BRC or a well-placed long-term PNS should support the technical working groups, in a process to develop a guideline for PRC/BRC volunteer management and build skills in community facilitation and communication. These investments will improving the effectiveness and efficiency of programs, improving community engagement, reducing conflict and miscommunication. Some areas for inclusion could be (*in italics are areas developed by one group during the validation workshop*):
- *How to recruit, coach and retain volunteers*
 - Provide group orientation and refresher orientations at regular intervals
- *training in basic community facilitation including managing assemblies*
 - Recognise that volunteers are the front line communicators with communities including using informal discussions on selection and programme processes - orientate fully volunteers in these processes for all sectors and how to bring this information into formal structures.
- (Note - this was developed during the validation workshop) The BRC or a well-placed long-term PNS should support the PRC develop clear guidelines to improve communication with communities including
- *Clarity on a focal points responsible for (defining communication messages)*
 - *Clarity in translating Red Cross concepts to community* (words like participation, core shelter)
 - Managing and promoting the use of community assemblies
- *How to interact with complain mechanisms such as hotline, suggestions and feedback boxes, ways to handle completes selection a focal person and feedback.*
- For future emergencies, The BRC or a well places long-term PNS should support the PRC to develop a structure for formal *walk-in consultations* to Red Cross office as a complement to the hotline or a regular *open desk* in communities. However, the need for this should reduce with improved communications through assemblies and volunteer communication training.
- For future emergencies, The BRC or a well-placed long-term PNS should support the PRC to develop a guideline and mechanism for total community processes including integrated programming, including re-sequencing existing rather than adding processes, thus maintaining targets and sector focus (developed during workshop, see text for details). This should include a mecha-

nism for community participation in the design of interventions within their communities, aligned with RC sectorial capacities. This process should start with community centric programming, such as DRR and WASH, to build trust and relationships before high value individual/household level interventions such as shelter. (Note - this was developed during the validation workshop). The guideline should aim to

- help build community resilience and allow for appropriate programme benefits to go to the appropriate person in need. This guideline would detail the building of relationships with the community, allow each section to work more effectively together and improve not just selection but also allow communities to assign appropriate assistance to those who would benefit most. During the validation workshop one group designed an ideal timeline for integrated programming. This re-sequencing of the actual assistance provided during the recovery period, whilst blanket unconditional cash transfers take place
- Include an initial period of trust building to focus on integration issues and inclusiveness, starting with a multi-sector VCA and analysis, to plan for resilience building and integrated (community and Red Cross) joint sector planning recovery planning, whilst the emergency response and unconditional cash transfers is ongoing.
- detail the formation of the barangay recovery committee to work on community processes for DRR, WASH and Health, followed by community centric livelihoods.
- Once trust is built and a tone is set for the barangay recovery committee to make community decisions, then individual selections for livelihood and shelter support can take place using community-wide assemblies and regular verification/re-validation by Red Cross

External Evaluation Livelihoods and Shelter Recovery in Iloilo Province

Summary

Project: External evaluation of British Red Cross DEC Philippines Haiyan Phase 2: Livelihoods and Shelter Recovery in Iloilo Province.

Lead: An external consultant, working in close collaboration with British Red Cross (BRC) and Philippines Red Cross (PRC).

Commissioner: BRC's Philippines Country Manager (based in Manila)

Audience: BRC, PRC, DEC (secretariat and members), general humanitarian community (through ALNAP website), general public (through BRC website)

Timeframe: Anticipated 30 full working days, between November 2015 and February 2016, with approximately half time spent in field during January / early February 2015.

Location: Primarily Iloilo Province, Philippines

Background

Typhoon Haiyan (local name Yolanda), which struck the Philippines in November 2013, was the strongest storm ever known to make landfall. Over 6,000 people died, a million homes were damaged or destroyed, and an estimated 14 million people were affected across the central Visayas region. A major international response was mobilised, and in the UK the DEC appeal raised over £95million. Approximately £6.4million was allocated to BRC, of which £1.8million was spent in Phase 1 (initial 6 months) and the remaining £4.6million has been utilised in Phase 2.

Following the initial disaster response phase, the BRC worked with Philippines Red Cross (PRC), IFRC and Movement partners to develop a country-wide plan for recovery. This resulted in BRC and PRC working in partnership in Iloilo province, an area that was badly affected by the typhoon but remained underserved by the humanitarian sector. BRC and PRC initiated a £10million, integrated recovery programme in two municipalities of Iloilo, which includes shelter, livelihoods, health, DRR and wash interventions. In April 2014, BRC submitted a plan to DEC to use Phase 2 funds to pay for a considerable portion of this recovery programme, namely shelter interventions for 8,500 households (including core shelter construction, shelter repair assistance and PASSA) and livelihoods interventions for 3,000 individuals (cash grants and livelihoods training), to be completed by October 2015.

The project target were subsequently adapted due to additional DEC funding and changing situation on the ground, so that the current target for DEC-funded activities is to provide 3530 households with shelter repair assistance, build 1004 core shelter, provide 5179 individuals with cash grants, livelihoods training for 5180 people, and deliver 15 community livelihoods projects.

Each of these activities is on track to be completed by the end of October 2015, and BRC is commissioning an evaluation to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact to date, and to give recommendations for the ongoing Iloilo Recovery Programme (which continues until September 2016), and future BRC programmes.

Scope

The primary aim of the evaluation will be to assess the **effectiveness, efficiency, and impact** of DEC-funded activities within the Iloilo Recovery Programme (shelter and livelihood interventions), and to compare against planned objectives and outcomes. There will be scope to focus on a variety of topics, to be finalised during planning, but the following issues may be tackled:

- > **Effectiveness:** Did the project have a strong theory of change/logic with clearly articulated outcomes? To what extent has the project met its proposed outcomes and objectives?
- > **Efficiency:** To what extent have resources been used effectively and efficiently?
- > **Impact.** Are there any measurable HH level impacts to date (appreciating it is too early to look at longer term impact but this provides a space for observations on impact).
- > **Relevance:** To what extent did the project activities support those most in need? Was the scale and nature of the project appropriate and proportional to the PRC / BRC capacity, experience and mandate?
- > **Standards:** Have the Red Cross values and principles been respected, as well as the Code of Conduct standards and Sphere standards?
- > **Accountability:** To what extent have beneficiaries been involved in programme design and delivery?
- > **Learning:** Have past lessons and DEC or member RTE recommendations been considered?
- > **Coherence:** How effective has been the coordination with other RC Movement and non-Movement actors? How does the programme fit with other programmes implemented in by the HNS?
- > **Sustainability:** How does the programme fit with other (current and future) initiatives in the target communities, undertaken/supported by other actors? What is the extent to which the programme outcomes can be sustained in the communities without BRC support?

In addition, the evaluation will make **practical recommendations** to inform the delivery of current interventions and the planning and delivery of future BRC programming, especially major recovery programmes.

Evaluation Outputs

- > A detailed methodology **proposal** and work plan that demonstrates how the consultant will meet the evaluation objectives.
- > A **validation workshop** to present main findings and recommendations to field staff in Iloilo.
- > A final **written report**.
- > A **presentation** of findings and recommendations for UK staff (in London or via video conferencing).

Methodology

The evaluation should apply the principle of triangulation by using different sources of information. Methodology will be finalised by the consultant, though it is anticipated to include the following aspects:

- > Desk review of relevant documentation – programmatic and secondary sources of information on current needs.
- > Initial meetings with key stakeholders - BRC UK and Manila, and PRC Manila prior to the field visits.

- > Key informant interviews or other methods – with key staff, community members.
- > Focus group discussions or other methods at community level (with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries).
- > Workshops – bringing together key stakeholders to present findings, agree way forward. Options for including community representatives and beneficiaries as part of this workshop should be considered early on.

Preference will be given to participatory methodologies that encourage and allow for learning to be internalised by staff. Both baseline and endline information will be available to the consultant in December 2015.

Draft timeframe and workplan

This is a draft timeframe and work plan to give an indication of the level of work anticipated.

➤ Time	➤ Activities	➤ No. of days
➤ December	➤ Briefings	➤ 2
	➤ Desk review	➤ 4
	➤ Development of detailed proposal	➤ 2
	➤ Interviews (UK staff and other stakeholders)	➤ 2
➤ January	➤ Interviews Manila based staff	➤ 2
	➤ Interviews Iloilo based staff	➤ 1
	➤ Interviews Field based staff	➤ 2
	➤ Field Data Collection	➤ 14
	➤ Gather preliminary findings and deliver validation workshop	➤ 3
➤ February	➤ Draft evaluation report, and provide to BRC	➤ 4
	➤ Revise based on feedback into final report	➤ 2
➤ February	➤ Present findings to BRC	➤ 1
➤ TOTAL		➤ 40

Person specification

- > Minimum 10 years relevant professional experience (experience of RC Movement desirable)
- > Experience in recovery programming in response to large sudden-onset humanitarian response, ideally in a management position and involving shelter and livelihoods.
- > Experience of working in partnership as part of programme delivery.
- > Demonstrated experience of conducting reviews and evaluations, including design of methodology, and data collection and analysis.
- > Proven track record of conducting qualitative research, and of training local staff as data collection agents.
- > Strong facilitation skills, and proven ability to design and facilitate planning processes.
- > Demonstrable skills in writing high quality reports.
- > Fluency in English – both spoken and written.

- > Experience in the Philippines would be an advantage.

How to Apply

Interested candidates should submit their CVs and a proposal of no more than 3 pages, including suggested technical approach, methodologies, and monitoring data they would request in advance and a draft budget (inclusive of all consultancy fees and taxes). The deadline for submissions is October 30th 2015.

Roles and Responsibilities

Name – Job title (organisation, location)	Evaluation role	Evaluation responsibilities
Consultant	Lead evaluator	Leads evaluation technically, responsible for evaluation design, data collection, data analysis, and data presentation.
Dave Mather – Country Manager (BRC, Manila)	Commissioner	Overall responsible for evaluation, manages and directs Lead Evaluator, in communication with the P&A Adviser. Co-facilitator as needed in the validation workshop. Leading the design of re-planning process and using the evaluation results.
Sonia Morales – Programme Manager (BRC, Ajuy)	Coordinator and User	Responsible for feeding into the evaluation design, and using the results to improve the programme. Responsible for ensuring field logistics and security arrangements are arranged.
Luke Tredget, Programme Officer (BRC, London)	Evaluation Support	Feeding into evaluation design, in collaboration with the P&A Adviser. Actively participating in the evaluation process and following up with recommendation.
Arbie Baguios	Administrative support	Support with recruitment, contracting, booking meetings, feeding into the evaluation process as required
Emily Rogers – Performance and Accountability Adviser (BRC, London)	Technical adviser	Provides technical advice on evaluation design, management, data collection, analysis, presentation and use.
Shiela and Angel - M&E Officer, Assistant and supported by Volunteers (PRC, Ajuy)	Dependent on methodology	Support with field work and data collection, as required
Major Programme Board including Inma Lopez	Assurance	Oversee effective and efficient implementation. Reviews

		recommendations and ensures accountability
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Prepared By

Document Owner(s)	Project/Organization Role
Luke Tredget	Philippines Programme Officer
Dave Mather	Philippines Country Manager

TOR Version Control

Version	Date	Author	Change Description
1.	24/08/15	Luke Tredget	Initial Draft
2.	26/08/15	Luke Tredget	(revised on feedback from P&A)
3.	28/09/15	Dave Mather	Final incorporating comments received

Annex 2 - Number of packages per household in each of 57 Barangays

		Annex 4 - Number of packages per household in each of 57 Barangay's					Annex 4 - Number of packages per household in each of 57 Barangay's				
Municipality	Date: 13th March 2015	BARANGAY	Total population	# packages in relation to # HHs	Municipality	Date: 13th March 2015	BARANGAY	Total population	# packages in relation to # HHs		
Ajuy	1	Adcadarao	595	48%	Balasan	35	ARANJUEZ	1655	55%		
	2	Agbobolo	288	124%		36	BACOLOD	638	40%		
	3	Badiangan	1086	80%		37	BALANTI-AN	1740	58%		
	4	Barrido	1536	32%		38	BATUAN	731	86%		
	5	Bato Biasong	941	78%		39	CABALIC	1239	69%		
	6	Bay-ang	2622	45%		40	CAMAMBUGAN	2087	24%		
	7	Bucana Bunglas	348	109%		41	Dolores	363	62%		
	8	Central	1788	16%		42	GIMAMANAY	970	99%		
	9	Culasi	4401	31%		43	IPIL	907	106%		
	10	Lanjagan	1166	34%		44	KINALKALAN	1200	60%		
	11	Luca	3131	44%		45	LAWIS	1838	70%		
	12	Malayu-an	2790	35%		46	MALAPOC	435	141%		
	13	Mangorocoro	1142	38%		47	MAMHUT NORTE	1329	72%		
	14	Nasidman	490	99%		48	Mamhut Sur	1333	37%		
	15	Pantalan Nabaye	1125	36%		49	MAYA	1907	64%		
	16	Pantalan Navarro	453	75%		50	PANI-AN	1856	54%		
	17	Pedada	1265	59%		51	Poblacion NORTE	1578	46%		
	18	Pili	2606	39%		52	Poblacion Sur	2304	34%		
	19	Pinantan Diel	507	37%		53	QUIASAN	830	41%		
	20	Pinantan Elizalde	531	41%		54	SALONG	938	90%		
	21	Pinay Espinosa	1164	37%		55	SALVACION	767	102%		
	22	Poblacion	3350	27%		56	TINGUI-AN	1642	106%		
	23	Progreso	1611	78%		57	ZARAGOSA	1437	68%		
	24	Puente Bunglas	1307	34%				TOTAL Balasan	29,724	69%	
	25	Punta Buri	1024	85%		TOTAL ACROSS AJUY AND BALASAN				63%	
	26	Rojas	433	79%							
	27	San Antonio	1825	56%							
	28	Santo Rosario	2192	29%							
	29	Silagon	892	125%							
	30	Tagubanhon	923	93%							
	31	Taguhangin	863	47%							
	32	Tanduyan	703	96%							
	33	Tipacla	1555	52%							
	34	Tubogan	595	85%							
		TOTAL Ajuy	47,248	59%							

Annex 3 – Table of Iloilo recovery program activities and timeline

Outputs	Targets Planned	Targets Revised	DEC Funded Portion	% to DEC, against revised target if applicable	2014					2015					2016			Comments									
					J	J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M	A	M	J		J	A	S	O	N	D	J	F	M
Shelter repair assistance																											
Cash transfer + CGI distributed (original target)	3500	4180	3515	84%																							Original plan was for DEC to fund entire SRA activity to 3500 households, completed in November 2014. An additional 665 households were added in August 2015, funded by Jersey Government
PASSA/BBS champions engaged	8500	752	752	100%																							Decrease in target beneficiaries due to change in approach; instead of a intensive participatory approach to all shelter beneficiaries, shelter safety training focused on small number of 'shelter champions', e.g. local carpenters, masons.
Core shelter construction																											
Core shelters constructed	2500		1004	40%																							DEC are funding approximately 50% of overall core shelter construction.
Water and sanitation																											
Latrines constructed	2500		1004	40%																							
WASH-in-community - assessment	5	57	0																								
WASH-in-community - construction/implementation	5	57	0																								
PHAST (households) engaged	6400	7000	0																								
WASH-in-Schools - assessment	11	N/A	0																								
WASH-in-Schools - construction	11	N/A	0																								
CHAST (schools) rollout began	12	N/A	0																								
Health																											
Health facilities assessment and rehabilitation started	23	11	0																								
Health capacity building programme implemented	20	30	0																								
Livelihoods																											
Household livelihoods assistance provided	3500	5688	5689	100%																							It is important to note that this activity includes software components, including bookkeeping and financial management for microenterprises, and agricultural training for rice farmers.
Microenterprise and rice farmers group savings formed	248		255	103%																							
Farming schools enrollees	160																										
Community based livelihood projects started	15	40	18	45%																							These community livelihoods projects have been part-funded by DEC; a limiting factor has been time
Marketable skills training enrollees	1000	250																									
School on air (radio programme) assessment and implementation																											
DRR and education																											
Community VCA and development plan finished	57																										
Community-based DRR programme implementation started	10																										
School-based DRR programme implementation started	14																										
Schools assessment + reconstruction/rehabilitation began	5	4																									
Classroom assessment + reconstruction/rehabilitation began	20																										
School kits distributed	3000	6000																									
		DEC funded or part-funded																									